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Recent advances in string theory and inflationary cosmology have led to a surge of 
interest in the possible existence of an ensemble of cosmic regions, or “universes,” 
among the members of which key physical parameters, such as the masses of 
elementary particles and the coupling constants, might assume different values. The 
observed values in our cosmic region are then attributed to an observer selection 
effect (the so-called anthropic principle). The assemblage of universes has been 
dubbed “the multiverse.” In this paper I review the multiverse concept and the 
criticisms that have been advanced against it on both scientific and philosophical 
grounds.  
 




All cosmological models are constructed by augmenting the results of observations by a 
philosophical principle. Two examples from modern scientific cosmology are the 
principle of mediocrity and the so-called anthropic, or biophilic, principle. The principle 
of mediocrity, sometimes known as the Copernican principle, states that the portion of 
the universe we observe isn’t special or privileged, but is representative of the whole. 
Ever since Copernicus demonstrated that Earth does not lie at the centre of the universe, 
the principle of mediocrity has been the default assumption; indeed, it is normally 
referred to as simply “the cosmological principle.” This principle underpins the standard 
Friedmann-Robertson-Walker cosmological models. In recent years, however, an 
increasing number of cosmologists have stressed the inherent limitations of the principle 
of mediocrity. Scientific observations necessarily involve observer selection effects, 
especially in astronomy. One unavoidable selection effect is that our location in the 
universe must be consistent with the existence of observers. In the case of humans at 
least, observers imply life. Clearly, we could not find ourselves observing the universe 
from a location that did not permit life to emerge and evolve. This is the anthropic, or – to 
use more accurate terminology – biophilic, principle1. Stated this way – that the universe 
we observe must be consistent with the existence of observers – the biophilic principle 
seems to be merely a tautology. However, it carries non-trivial meaning when we drop 
the tacit assumption that the universe, and the laws of nature, necessarily assume the 
form that we observe. If the universe and its laws could have been otherwise, then one 
explanation for why they are as they are might be that we, the observers, have selected it 
from a large ensemble. 
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This biophilic selection principle becomes more concrete when combined with the 
assumption that what we have hitherto regarded as absolute and universal laws of physics 
are, in fact, more like local by-laws2: they are valid in our particular cosmic patch, but 
they might be different in other regions of space and/or time. This general concept of 
“variable laws” has been given explicit expression through certain recent theories of 
cosmology and particle physics. To take a simple example, it is widely accepted that at 
least some of the parameters in the standard model of particle physics are not “god-
given” fundamental constants of nature, but assume the values they do as a result of some 
form of symmetry breaking mechanism. Their observed values may thus reflect the 
particular quantum state in our region of the universe. If the universe attained its present 
state by cooling from a super-hot initial phase, then these symmetries may have been 
broken differently in different cosmic regions. There is little observational evidence for a 
domain structure of the universe within the scale of a Hubble volume, but on a much 
larger scale there could exist domains in which the coupling constants and particle 
masses in the standard model may be inconsistent with life. It would then be no surprise 
that we find ourselves located in a, possibly atypical, life-encouraging domain, as we 
could obviously not be located where life was impossible.  
More generally, there may exist other spacetime regions, which we may informally 
call “other universes,” that exhibit different physical laws and/or initial conditions. The 
ensemble of all such “universes” is often referred to2 as “the multiverse.” 
 
2. Varieties of multiverse 
 
An early application of the biophilic principle was made by Boltzmann as a possible 
explanation for why the universe is in a state far from thermodynamic equilibrium3,4. As 
there are vastly more states close to equilibrium than far from it, a randomly-selected 
portion of the universe inspected at a given time would be exceedingly unlikely to exhibit 
a significant departure from equilibrium conditions. (Boltzmann assumed a universe 
infinite in both space and time.) But, given that a significant departure from equilibrium 
conditions is an essential pre-requisite for the existence of observers, our region of the 
universe is not randomly selected; rather, it is selected by us. Boltmann argued that 
statistical fluctuations will always create minor excursions from thermodynamic 
equilibrium, and that major excursions, while exceedingly rare, are nevertheless possible 
in principle. In an infinite universe there will always be astronomically large regions 
somewhere which, solely on grounds of chance, exhibit sufficient departure from 
equilibrium to support the emergence of biological organisms. By hypothesis, ours is one 
such (exceedingly rare) region. 
Boltzmann’s original argument is unsatisfactory, because the existence of human 
observers does not require a Hubble-sized non-equilibrium region of the universe. Merely 
a solar system region would suffice, and a fluctuation on this much smaller scale is 
overwhelmingly more probable than a cosmic-scale fluctuation. Today, however, 
Boltzmann’s assumption of an infinitely old and uniform universe is discredited. 
Nevertheless, his basic reasoning may still be applied within the context of inflationary 
big bang cosmology, and the large fluctuation region objection possibly circumvented4-6. 
Boltzmann’s model universe provides an example of a restricted type of multiverse. 
In this case the laws of physics are uniform, but the thermodynamic circumstances are 
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not, because of random fluctuations. This ensures the existence of exceedingly rare 
atypical life-encouraging regions, which may then be selected by observers. 
Although multiverse ideas have been discussed by philosophers and, to a lesser 
extent, scientists for a long time, they have been propelled to prominence by two specific 
theoretical projects: string/M theory and eternal inflation. String theory, and its 
development as M theory, is an attempt to unify the forces and particles of physics at the 
Planck scale of energy, (ћc5/G)½. (Hereafter, unless stated to the contrary, I assume units 
ћ = c = 1.) A seemingly inevitable feature of this class of theories is that there is no 
unique low-energy limit. In fact, it isn’t easy to even quantify the enormous number of 
potential low-energy (“vacuum”) sectors of the theory, but one estimate7 puts the number 
of distinct vacuum states at greater than 10500. Each such sector would represent a 
possible world and possible low-energy physics. (The term “low-energy” is relative here; 
it means energies much less than the Planck energy, ~ 1028 eV. That includes almost all 
of what is traditionally called high-energy physics.) 
The problem arises because string theory is formulated most naturally in 10 or 11 
spacetime dimensions, whereas the spacetime of our perceptions is four dimensional. The 
extra space dimensions are rendered unobservable by a process called compactification: 
they are rolled up to a very small size. The situation may be compared to viewing a 
hosepipe. From a distance it appears as a wiggly line, but on close inspection it is seen as 
a two dimensional tube, with one dimension rolled up to a small circumference. In the 
same way, what appears to be a point in three-dimensional space may in fact be a circle 
going around a fourth space dimension. This basic notion may be extended to any 
number of extra dimensions, but then the process of compactification is no longer unique. 
In general, there are very many ways of compactifying several extra dimensions. When 
additional degrees of freedom in string theory are taken into account, compactification 
may involve several hundred variables, all of which may vary from one region of the 
universe to another. These variables serve to fix the low-energy physics, by determining 
what sorts of particles exist, what their masses might be and the nature and strengths of 
the forces that act between them. The theory also permits compactification to spaces with 
other than three dimensions. Thus string theory predicts myriad possible low-energy 
worlds. Some might be quite like ours, but with slightly heavier electrons or a somewhat 
stronger weak force. Others might differ radically, and possess, say, five large (i.e. 
uncompactified) space dimensions and two species of photons. 
One can envisage an energy landscape in these several hundred variables7. Within 
this landscape there will be countless local minima, each corresponding to a possible 
quantum vacuum state, and each a possible low-energy physical world. One of the 
parameters determined by each local minimum is the value of that minimum itself, which 
receives a well-known interpretation in terms of Einstein’s cosmological constant, Λ. 
This parameter may be thought of as the energy density of the quantum vacuum. 
Although string theory predicts a vast number of alternative low-energy physical 
worlds, the theory alone does not ensure that all such worlds are physically instantiated. 
The real existence of these other worlds, or “pocket universes” as Susskind has called 
them7, is rendered plausible when account is taken of inflationary universe cosmology. 
According to this now-standard model, the universe at or near its origin possessed a very 
large vacuum energy (or Λ). A Λ term in Einstein’s gravitational field equations behaves 
like a repulsive force, causing the universe to expand exponentially. This so-called 
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inflationary episode may have lasted no longer than about 10-35s in our “pocket universe” 
before the enormous primordial vacuum energy decayed to the presently-observed value, 
releasing the energy difference as heat. After this brief inflationary episode, the hot big 
bang model remains much as it was in the 1970’s, involving the early synthesis of 
helium, eventual galaxy and star formation, etc.  
In the fashionable variant known as eternal inflation, due to Andrei Linde8, our 
“universe” is just one particular vacuum bubble within a vast –probably infinite – 
assemblage of bubbles, or pocket universes. If one could take a god’s-eye-view of this 
multiverse of universes, inflation would be continuing frenetically in the overall 
superstructure, driven by exceedingly large vacuum energies, while here and there 
“bubbles” of low-, or at least lower-, energy vacuum would nucleate quantum 
mechanically from the eternally inflating region, and evolve into pocket universes. When 
eternal inflation is put together with the complex landscape of string theory, there is 
clearly a mechanism for generating universes with different local by-laws, i.e. different 
low-energy physics. Each bubble nucleation proceeding from a very large vacuum energy 
represents a symbolic “ball” rolling down the landscape from some dizzy height at 
random, and ending up in one of the valleys, or vacuum states. So the ensemble of 
physical by-laws available from string theory becomes actualized as an ensemble of 
pocket universes, each with its own distinctive low-energy physics. The total number of 
such universes may be infinite, and the total variety of possible low-energy physics finite, 
but stupendously big. 
According to Linde9, the size of a typical inflationary region is enormous, even by 
Hubble radius standards. The expansion rate is exponential with an e folding time of 
2πMP2/m2, where MP is the Planck mass and m is the mass of the scalar inflaton field, the 
energy density of which drives the inflationary expansion. The resulting inflationary 
domains have a typical size ~ MP-1 exp(2πMP2/m2). For a scalar field with GUT mass, m ~ 
10-5MP and a typical inflation region has a staggering size exp (1011) ~ 1010,000,000,000 cm, 
which should be compared to a Hubble radius of 1028 cm. Clearly the observed universe 
would almost certainly lie deep within such an inflation region, implying that the next 
“pocket universe” would be located exponentially far away, and therefore will be 
decisively unobservable. In this model, the existence of other universes with differing 
physical laws has to be accepted on purely theoretical grounds.  
The existence of a multiverse does not rest on the validity of string theory or even 
inflationary cosmology as such. Rather, it is a generic property of any attempt to explain 
at least some low-energy physics as the product of particular quantum states combined 
with a model of the universe originating in a big bang. Other multiverse theories exist in 
the literature. Perhaps the best known is the Everett interpretation of quantum 
mechanics10. In its modern form, this so-called “many-universes” theory postulates that 
all branches of a wave function represent equally real universes existing in parallel11. 
Thus, even quantum superpositions restricted to the atomic level are associated with an 
ensemble of entire universes. Although the quantum multiverse seems at first sight to be 
a completely different type of theory from the cosmological multiverse, the two fuse 
when quantum mechanics is applied to cosmology. Thus if one writes down a formal 
wave function for the universe12, then the different Everett branches of this cosmic wave 
function may be associated with different universes within an overall multiverse. 
Tegmark has argued13 that because theories such as eternal inflation stem from an 
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application of quantum cosmology, then Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics 
does not actually increase the size or nature of the ensemble of universe that make up the 
already-postulated multiverse. The reason is the following: if the quantum fluctuations 
represented by the wave function of the universe are ergodic, then the distribution of 
outcomes (i.e. distinct Everett branches) within a given Hubble volume is the same as a 
sample of different Hubble volumes described by a single branch of the wave function. 
Another multiverse model has been discussed by Smolin14. He proposes that “baby” 
universes can sprout from existing ones via the mechanism of gravitational collapse. 
According to the classical picture, when a star implodes to form a black hole, a spacetime 
singularity results in the interior of the hole. Smolin suggests that a quantum treatment 
would lead instead to the nucleation of a tiny new region of inflating space, connected to 
our space via a wormhole. Subsequent evaporation of the black hole by the Hawking 
process severs the wormhole, thereby spatially disconnecting the baby universe from 
ours. Furthermore, following Wheeler15, Smolin proposes that the violence of 
gravitational collapse might ‘reprocess’ the laws of physics randomly, producing small 
changes in values of parameters such as particle masses and coupling constants. Thus the 
baby universe will inherit the physics of its parent, but with small random variations, 
similar to genetic drift in biological evolution. This process could continue ad infinitum, 
with baby universes going on to produce their own progeny. It would also imply that our 
universe is the product of an earlier gravitational collapse episode in another universe. 
Those universes whose physical parameters favoured black hole production, for example 
by encouraging the formation of large stars, would produce more progeny, implying that 
among the ensemble of universes with all possible variations of the laws of physics, those 
universes with prolific black hole production would represent the largest volume of 
space.  
This by no means exhausts the multiverse possibilities; there are many logically and 
physically possible models in which an ensemble of universes can be described. Of recent 
interest are the brane theories, in which “our universe” is regarded as a three-dimensional 
sheet or brane embedded in a higher-dimensional space16. Observers, along with most 
matter and radiation, are confined to a three-brane by a large potential gradient. In the 
ekpyrotic model of Steinhardt and Turok15, a brane collides with a confining three-
dimensional boundary to a four-dimensional space to create what we interpret as the big 
bang. Conceptually, there is no impediment to foliating a four-dimensional space with 
any number of branes, each of which (at least in the absence of collisions) constitutes a 
universe in its own right. 
An extreme version of the multiverse has been proposed by Tegmark13. Not content 
to imagine universes with all possible values of the fundamental “constants” of physics, 
Tegmark envisages universes with completely different laws of physics, including those 
describable by unconventional mathematics such as fractals. In fact, he suggests that all 
logically possible universes actually exist. Naturally the vast majority of such universes 
would not support life and so go unobserved. 
Tegmark justifies his extravagant hypothesis by appealing to the principle that the 
whole can be simpler than its parts. To take an elementary illustration, consider an 
infinite one-dimensional array of equi-spaced points (a “crystal”). This structure, though 
infinite, is simply described by specifying the interval between adjacent points. Now 
extract from the array a random set of points. By definition, what remains is also a 
 6
random set. We have replaced a simple set by two random subsets. But a random set 
requires a great deal of information to specify it, so it is more complex (in a manner that 
can be made mathematically precise using algorithmic information theory18). Thus the 
fusion of two complex sets can produce a simple set. In this manner, the set of all 
possible logically self-consistent universes might be regarded as simpler than most 
individual members of that set. In other words, Tegmark’s extreme multiverse might well 
be simpler than our single observed universe and therefore, invoking Occam’s razor, it 
should be favoured as a description of reality. 
It is clear that if physical reality is less than the set of all possible universes, then 
there has to be some rule or algorithm that separates the set of actually-existing universes 
from the set of merely-possible but in fact non-existing universes. In the orthodox single-
universe view of reality, there has always been the mystery of “why this universe?” 
among all the apparently limitless possibilities. To use Hawking’s evocative expression19, 
what is it that “breathes fire” into one particular set of equations (i.e. the set describing 
this world) to single them out for the privilege of being attached to a really-existing 
universe? This problem of what separates the actual from the merely-possible persists in 
less extreme versions of the multiverse, versions in which the members, even if infinite in 
number, do not exhaust the set of all possibilities. If there is a rule that divides the actual 
universe/s from the merely-possible, one can ask, why that rule rather than some other? 
Given the infinite number of possible rules, the application of one particular rule appears 
arbitrary and absurd. And one can always question where the rule comes from in the first 
place. But by embracing the Tegmark model of reality – all or nothing – these 
philosophical problems seem to be evaded. However, they are replaced by others (see 
Section 4). 
 
3. Anthropic fine tuning 
 
The principle observational support for the multiverse hypothesis comes from a 
consideration of biology. As remarked in Section 1, the universe we observe is bio-
friendly, or we would not be observing it. This tautology develops some force when 
account is taken of the sensitivity of biology to the form of the laws of physics and the 
cosmological initial conditions – the so-called fine-tuning problem. It has been the 
subject of discussion for some decades that if the laws of physics differed, in some cases 
only slightly, from their observed form, then life as we know it, and possibly any form of 
life, would be impossible. Here are some well-known examples. 
 
A. Carbon production 
 
An early example of anthropic fine tuning was discussed by Hoyle20. Life as we know it 
is based on carbon, which is synthesised in stellar cores via the triple alpha reaction. This 
is a two-stage process that involves the formation of Be8 from two alpha (He4) particles 
followed by the capture of a third alpha particle via a resonant state. The energy of this 
resonant state happily coincides with typical thermal energies of helium nuclei in massive 
stars, ensuring an abundance of carbon production. This remarkable coincidence of 
energies arising from completely different branches of physics was in fact not known at 
the time Hoyle studied the nucleosynthesis problem; rather, he deduced that such a 
 7
felicitously-placed resonance must exist, given that carbon-based observers exist. 
Subsequent experiments proved him right20. The onward burning of carbon to oxygen is 
restrained by the absence of a similar resonant state at comparable energies. If the 
interplay of particle masses, the strong and electromagnetic forces were only slightly 
different, the position of this resonance would be displaced sufficiently for carbon 
production to decline dramatically. If the strong force were substantially weaker, or the 
electromagnetic force substantially stronger, the stability of carbon nuclei would be 
threatened. 
A further fortuitous aspect to carbon production involves the weak nuclear force21. 
Carbon is disseminated through the interstellar medium in part from supernova 
explosions, which are triggered by a pulse of neutrinos released from collapsing stellar 
cores of massive stars. The neutrinos couple to the surrounding stellar material via the 
weak nuclear force. If the weak force were weaker, this mechanism would be ineffective; 
if it were stronger the neutrinos would be trapped in the dense imploding cores. In either 
case, the vital carbon would remain confined to the stars, and not be available for life 
processes on planets. (The latter argument is weakened to some extent by the existence of 
other mechanisms for dispersing carbon, such as stellar winds.) 
 
B. Hydrogen and water 
 
If the strong nuclear force were only about 4 per cent stronger, the di-proton would be 
bound, but unstable against decay via the weak force to deuterium. This would have 
profound implications for primordial nucleosynthesis and the chemical make up of the 
universe. As pointed out by Dyson22, the primordial soup of protons would rapidly 
transform into deuterium, which would then synthesize 100 per cent helium, leaving no 
hydrogen in the universe. Without hydrogen, there would be no water, an essential 
ingredient for life. There would also be no stable hydrogen-burning stars like the sun to 
sustain a biosphere. 
 
C. Space dimensionality 
 
It has been known for a long time that the stability of planetary orbits depends crucially 
on space having three dimensions23. In a four-dimensional space, for example, gravitation 
would obey an inverse cube law, and planets would rapidly spiral into the sun. It is hard 
to see how life as we know it could exist in more than three space dimensions. Life in 
two space dimensions is not obviously impossible, but problems with wave propagation 
might compromise information processing, precluding any advanced form of life (i.e. 
observers).  
 
D. Strength of gravity 
 
Gravitation is famously much weaker than the other forces of nature: 
 
 e2/Gmp2 ~ 1040 
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where e is the charge on the proton and mp the proton mass. The strength of gravity sets 
the time and distance scale of the universe: the universe is big because gravity is so weak. 
But a big universe implies an old universe, and an old universe (billions of years) is a 
necessary prerequisite for the emergence of complex organisms. If gravitation were 100 
times stronger, the universe would collapse before observers had time to evolve. 
 
E. Primordial density perturbations 
 
The emergence of large scale structure in the universe depends on density perturbations 
in the early universe to act as seeds of galaxies. Observations by COBE and WMAP 
show that the density contrast at the time of matter-radiation decoupling (380,000 years 
after the big bang) was about one part in 105. If the perturbations were significantly less 
than this, galaxies may never have formed, and the production of stars and planets would 
be unlikely. Conversely, stronger density perturbations would lead to the formation of 
supermassive black holes rather than galaxies. The observed density perturbations appear 
to be optimal as far as the eventual emergence of life is concerned2. 
 
F. The cosmological constant 
 
A major unsolved problem of fundamental physics is the value of the cosmological 
constant Λ (i.e. the energy of the quantum vacuum). There is no satisfactory physical 
theory that explains why this parameter should be non-zero, yet so much smaller than the 
“natural” Planck value MP4: 
 
  Λobs  ~ 10-123 MP4. 
 
The possibility of an anthropic explanation for this staggering mismatch between 
theory and observation is now two decades old24,25, but has received more attention26 
since the observational confirmation that Λ ≠ 0. The basic idea is that Λ is treated as a 
random variable that may change from one region of space to another. In the eternal 
inflationary model, it might, for example, take on different random values in each 
inflation region (i.e. each “pocket universe”). The range of values consistent with the 
emergence of biological organisms is fairly constrained. If Λ were an order or magnitude 
larger, the formation of galaxies would be seriously inhibited. There is no impediment to 
|Λ| being smaller, but Λ should not be much larger than its observed numerical value and 
also negative, or it would bring about the collapse of the universe (a “big crunch”) before 
life and observers had had time to emerge25. 
 
4. Arguments against the multiverse concept 
 
A variety of arguments has been deployed against both the multiverse concept and 
anthropic reasoning in general. These arguments are both physical and philosophical. 
 
1. It’s not science 
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It is sometimes objected that because our observations are limited to a single universe 
(e.g. a Hubble volume) then the existence of “other universes” cannot be observed, and 
so their existence cannot be considered a proper scientific hypothesis. Even taking into 
account the fact that future observers will see a larger particle horizon, and so have access 
to a bigger volume of space, most regions of the multiverse (at least in the eternal 
inflation model) can never be observed, even in principle. While this may indeed 
preclude direct confirmation of the multiverse hypothesis, it does not rule out the 
possibility that it may be tested indirectly. Almost all scientists and philosophers accept 
the general principle that the prediction of unobservable entities is an acceptable 
scientific hypothesis if those entities stem from a theory that has other testable 
consequences. At this stage, string theory does not have any clear-cut experimental 
predictions, but one may imagine that a future elaboration of the theory would produce 
testable consequences; similarly for other multiverse models, such as brane theories or 
the production of baby universes. These theories are not idle speculations, but emerge 
from carefully considered theoretical models with some empirical justification. 
A test of the multiverse hypothesis may be attained by combining it with biophilic 
selection2,13. This leads to statistical predictions about the observed values of physical 
parameters. If we inhabit a typical biophilic region of the multiverse, we would expect 
the observed values of any biologically-relevant adjustable parameters to assume typical 
values. In other words, if we consider a vast parameter space of possible universes, there 
will be one or more biophilic patches, or subsets, of the space, and a typical biophilic 
universe would not lie close to the centre of such a patch. Thus, consider Bolztmann’s 
“multiverse” hypothesis, where the parameter was entropy. Fluctuations in entropy are 
exponentially suppressed with departure from the maximum value, so that, if the 
biophilic explanation were correct, we would not expect to inhabit a region of the 
multiverse in which the entropy was much less than the minimum necessary for the 
existence of observers. As discussed in Section 2, the fact that we inhabit at least a 
Hubble volume of low entropy must be counted as strong evidence against Boltzmann’s 
hypothesis.  
Now suppose we apply the same reasoning to the value of the dark energy, Λ. In the 
absence of a good physical theory, it is not possible to know the probability distribution 
of values of Λ but, for the purpose of illustration, suppose it is uniform in the range 
[−Λmax, +Λmax], where Λmax is some maximum permitted value (e.g. the Planck value). 
Now consider a randomly selected observer. By hypothesis, the observer would have to 
inhabit a universe in which Λ lies within the biophilic range, say, [−Λb, +Λb], where |Λb| 
<< |Λmax|. If the observed value of the cosmological constant Λobs were determined to be 
Λobs << Λb, this would count as evidence against an anthropic explanation, because there 
would exist many more habitable universes in which Λobs ~ Λb, and one could defend the 
mutliverse hypothesis only on the unjustified assumption that humans occupied an 
atypical habitable universe. Calculations suggest that Λobs ≈ 0.1Λb, which is consistent 
with a random selection from a uniform probability distribution2. If, contrary to 
observation, Λ were indistinguishable from zero, it would be reasonable to seek some 
deep principle of physics that fixes its value to be precisely zero. 
In Smolin’s theory14, there is a specific prediction that universes which maximise 
black hole production dominate the total available spatial volume. Because star 
production (leading to black holes) is also a good criterion for carbon production and the 
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establishment of habitable zones in planetary systems, these universes are also the ones 
likely to be inhabited. So randomly-selected observers would be expected to find 
themselves in universes in which black hole production is maximised. This is testable by 
determining whether or not star production depends sensitively on the observed values of 
physical parameters such as particle masses and force strengths. If, say, a small change 
either way in the proton mass were to markedly reduce star production, or the collapse of 
stars into black holes, it would provide support for Smolin’s theory. Conversely, if it 
could be demonstrated that certain changes in the physical parameters might actually 
increase the rate of black hole formation, it would falsify Smolin’s theory. 
 
2. It’s bad science 
 
Even if it is conceded that the multiverse theory is testable in principle, one might still 
object to the theory on professional grounds. Some physicists have argued that the job of 
the scientist is to provide fundamental explanations for observed phenomena, without 
making reference to observers. Resorting to anthropic explanations may serve to 
undermine the search for a satisfactory physical theory, constituting a “lazy way out” of 
the need to account for features such as the apparent fine-tuning of parameters in relation 
to the existence of life. Thus, biophilic arguments have been criticized by some in very 
strong terms. Whatever one’s predilection for anthropic reasoning, its supporters at least 
concede it should be an explanation of last resort27. Set against this is the claim by some 
theorists (for example, Susskind7) that some form of multiverse is unavoidable, given our 
current knowledge of physics, and that observer selection effects are inevitable and must 
be taken into account in most sciences. 
 
3. There is only one possible universe 
 
It is occasionally argued that the observed universe is the unique possible universe, so 
that talk of “other” universes is ipso facto meaningless. Einstein raised this possibility 
when he said28, in his typical poetic manner, that what really interested him was whether 
“God had any choice in the creation of the world.” To express this sentiment more 
neutrally, Einstein was asking whether the universe could have been otherwise (or non-
existent altogether). The hope is sometimes expressed that once a fully unified theory of 
physics is achieved, it will turn out to have a unique “solution” corresponding to the 
observed universe. It is too soon to say whether string/M theory will eventually yield a 
unique description (so far, the evidence is to the contrary), but the hypothesis of a unique 
reality would in any case seem to be easily dispatched. The job of the theoretical 
physicist is to construct mathematically consistent models of reality in the form of 
simplified, impoverished descriptions of the real world. For example, the so-called 
Thirring model29 describes a two spacetime dimensional world inhabited by self-
interacting fermions. It is studied because it offers an exactly soluble model in quantum 
field theory. Nobody suggests the Thirring model is a description of the real world, but it 
is clearly a possible world. So unless some criterion can be found to eliminate all the 
simplified models of physics, including such familiar constructs as Newtonian 
mechanics, there would seem to be a strong prima facie case that the universe could 
indeed have been otherwise – that “God did have a choice.” 
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4. Measures of fine-tuning are meaningless 
 
Intuitively we may feel that some physical parameters are remarkably fine-tuned for life, 
but can this feeling ever be made mathematically precise? The fact that a variation in the 
strength of the strong nuclear force by only a few per cent may disrupt the biological 
prospects for the universe appears to offer a surprisingly narrow window of biophilic 
values, but what determines the measure on the space of parameters? If the strength of the 
nuclear force could in principle vary over an infinite range, then any finite window, 
however large, would be infinitesimally improbable if a uniform probability distribution 
is adopted. Even the simple expedient of switching from a uniform to a logarithmic 
distribution can have a dramatic change on the degree of improbability of the observed 
values, and hence the fineness of the fine-tuning. There will always be an element of 
judgement involved in assessing the significance, or degree of surprise, that attaches to 
any given example.  
Many key parameters of physics do not seem to be very strongly constrained by 
biology. Take the much-cited example of carbon abundance. The existence of carbon as a 
long-lived element depends on the ratio of electromagnetic to strong nuclear forces, 
which determines the stability of the nucleus. But nuclei much heavier than carbon are 
stable, so the life-giving element lies comfortably within the stability range. The 
electromagnetic force could be substantially stronger, without threatening the stability of 
carbon. Of course, if it were stronger, then the specific nuclear resonance responsible for 
abundant carbon would be inoperable, but it’s not clear how serious this would be. Life 
could arise, albeit more sparsely, in a universe where carbon was merely a trace element, 
or abundant carbon could occur because of different nuclear resonances. Of course, if it 
could be shown that other, heavier, elements are essential for life this objection would 
disappear. (The prediction that much heavier elements are essential for life could be an 
interesting prediction of the multiverse theory.) 
These considerations of how to quantify the fine-tuning are worse to the point of 
intractability when it comes to assigning statistical weights to alternative laws, or 
alternative mathematical structures as proposed by Tegmark13.  
 
5 . Multiverses merely shift the problem up one level 
 
 Multiverse proponents are often vague about how the parameter values are selected 
across the defined ensemble. If there is a “law of laws” or meta-law describing how 
parameter values are assigned from one universe to the next, then we have only shifted 
the problem of cosmic biophilicity up one level, because we need to explain where the 
meta-law comes from. Moreover, the set of such meta-laws is infinite, so we have merely 
replaced the problem of “why this universe?” with that of “why this meta-law?” This 
point was already made at the end of section 2. But now we encounter a further problem. 
Each meta-law specifies a different multiverse, and not all multiverses are bound to 
contain at least one biophilic universe. In fact, on the face of it, most multiverses would 
not contain even one component universe in which all the parameter values were suitable 
for life. To see this, note that each parameter will have a small range of values – envisage 
it as a highlighted segment on a line in a multi-dimensional parameter space – consistent 
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with biology. Only in universes where all the relevant highlighted segments intersect in a 
single patch (i.e. all biophilic values are instantiated simultaneously) will biology be 
possible. If the several parameters vary independently between universes, each according 
to some rule, then for most sets of rules the highlighted segments will not concur. So we 
must not only explain why there is any meta-law; we must also explain why the actual 
meta-law (i.e. the actual multiverse) happens to be one that intersects the requisite patch 
of parameter space that permits life. And if the parameters do not vary independently, but 
are linked by an underlying unified physical theory, then each underlying theory will 
represent a different track in parameter space. Only in some unification theories would 
this track intersect the biophilic region. So one is now confronted with explaining why 
this particular underlying unified theory, with its felicitous biophilic confluence of 
parameter values, is the one that has “fire breathed into it,” to paraphrase Hawking. In 
Tegmark’s extreme multiverse theory this problem is circumvented, because in that case 
all possible meta-laws (or all possible unified theories) have “fire breathed into them” 
and describe really-existing multiverses. 
 Sometimes it is claimed that there is no meta-law, only randomness. Wheeler, for 
example, has asserted30 that “there is no law except the law that there is no law.” In 
Smolin’s version of the multiverse14, gravitational collapse events “reprocess” the 
existing laws with small random variations. In this case, given a multiverse with an 
infinity of component universes, randomness would ensure that at least one biophilic 
universe exists. (That is, there will always be a patch of parameter space somewhere with 
all highlighted segments intersecting.) However, the assumption of randomness is not 
without its own problems. Once again, without a measure over the parameter space, 
probabilities cannot be properly defined. There is also a danger in some multiverse 
models that the biophilic target universes may form only a set of measure zero in the 
parameter space, and thus be only infinitesimally probable31. Furthermore, in some 
models, various randomness measures may be inconsistent with the underlying physics. 
For example, in the model of a single spatially infinite universe in which different supra-
Hubble regions possess different total matter densities, it is inconsistent to apply the rule 
that any value of the density may be chosen randomly in the interval [0, ρ], where ρ is 
some arbitrarily large density (e.g. the Planck density). The reason is that for all densities 
above a critical value that is very low compared to the Planck density, the universe is 
spatially finite, and so inconsistent with the assumption of an infinite number of finite 
spatial regions31.  
The need to rule out these “no-go” zones of the parameter space imposes restrictions 
on the properties of the multiverse that are tantamount to the application of an additional 
overarching biophilic principle. There would seem to be little point in invoking an 
infinity of universes only to then impose biophilic restrictions at the multiverse level. It 
would be simpler to postulate a single universe with a biophilic principle. 
 
6. The fake universe problem 
 
The multiverse theory forces us to confront head-on the contentious issue of what is 
meant by physical reality. Is it meaningful to assign equal ontological status to our own, 
observed, universe and universes that are never observed by any sentient being? This old 
philosophical conundrum is exacerbated when account is taken of the nature of 
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observation. In most discussions of multiverse theory, an observer is simply taken to 
mean a complex biological organism. But this is too restricted. Most scientists are 
prepared to entertain the possibility of conscious machines, and some artificial 
intelligence (AI) advocates even claim we are not far from producing conscious 
computers. In most multiverse theories, although habitable universes may form only a 
sparse subset, there is still a stupendous number of them, and in many cases an infinite 
number. (That is the case with Boltmann’s original model, and eternal inflation, for 
example.) It is therefore all but inevitable that some finite fraction of habitable universes 
in this vast – possibly infinite – set, will contain communities of organisms that evolve to 
the point of creating artificial intelligence or simulated consciousness. It is then but a 
small step to the point where the engineered conscious beings inhabit a simulated world. 
For such beings, their “fake” universe will appear indistinguishable from reality. So 
should we include these simulated universes in the ensemble that constitutes the 
multiverse? At least two multiverse proponents have suggested that we might32. 
The problem that now arises is that any given “real” universe with world-simulating 
technology could simulate a limitless number of “fake” universes, so within the extended 
multiverse hypothesis, fake universes greatly outnumber real ones. (For strong AI 
proponents, who assert that consciousness may be simulated by universal discrete-state 
machines, this conclusion is reinforced by the Turing thesis, which implies that the 
simulations may themselves generate simulations, and so on.) This means that a 
randomly-selected observer is overwhelmingly likely to inhabit a fake, rather than a real, 
universe. By implication, “our” universe is very probably a simulation33. But if it is a 
simulation, then the application of physical theory to unobserved regions/universes is 
invalid, because there is no reason to suppose that the simulating system will consistently 
apply the observed physics of our simulation to other, unobserved, simulations. Thus the 
multiverse hypothesis would seem to contain, Gödel-like, the elements of its own 
invalidity. 
An additional philosophical problem that afflicts most multiverse models (e.g. 
Boltzmann’s, Linde’s) is the familiar one that in an infinite universe anything that can 
happen, will happen, and happen infinitely often, purely by chance. This is also discussed 
as the problem of duplicate beings34. Thus eternal inflation predicts that 10 to the power 
1029 cm away there will exist a planet indistinguishable from Earth, with beings 
indistinguishable from us13. By the same reasoning there will be an identical Hubble 
volume to ours about 10 to the power 10115 cm away. Furthermore, there will be infinitely 
many such identical persons, or identical Hubble volumes, or identical super-Hubble 
volumes, in the multiverse. Though there is no logical impediment of physical reality 
being infinitely replicated in either space or time, any physical theory that predicts such a 
situation invites especially skeptical scrutiny. 
 
7. Why stop there? 
 
A final objection to the existing multiverse theories is a challenge to the criteria for 
defining universes. In most multiverse theories, universes are labeled by laws of physics 
and initial conditions. Even in Tegmark’s extreme multiverse scheme, his chosen 
criterion is mathematical consistency. It might be objected that these terms are narrow 
and chauvinistic – indeed, just the sort of criteria to be expected from mathematical 
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physicists. Other ways of categorizing universes are conceivable, and could lead to even 
larger concepts of multiverse than Tegmark’s. Examples might be the set of all possible 
artistic structures, or morally good systems, or mental states. There may be criteria for 
categorization that lie completely beyond the scope of human comprehension. To 
suppose that the ultimate nature of reality is founded in twenty-first century human 




Recent developments in particle physics, quantum mechanics and cosmology lead 
naturally to the postulate of an ensemble of universes, or multiverse. Some extension to 
the restricted view that “what you see is what you get” would surely seem both inevitable 
and reasonable to all but the most out-and-out logical positivist, if only because the limits 
imposed by the cosmological particle horizon are merely relative to our specific cosmic 
location. Although direct confirmation of other universes, or regions of our universe, may 
be infeasible or even impossible in principle, nevertheless the multiverse theory does 
make some observable predictions and can be tested.  
 For most people, somewhere on the slippery slope between being asked to accept the 
existence of regions of space that lie beyond our present particle horizon, and Tegmark’s 
“anything goes” multiverse, credulity will dwindle. Some version of a multiverse is 
reasonable given the current world view of physics, but most physicists would stop well 
before Tegmark’s multiverse. They would also regard the prediction of a proliferation of 
artificially simulated universes (“fake” universes), as a reductio ad absurdum of the 
multiverse hypothesis. 
 Invoking the multiverse together with the anthropic, or biophilic, principle in an 
attempt to explain fine-tuning is still regarded with great suspicion, or even hostility, 
among physicists, although it has some notable apologists. There is consensus that such 
explanations should not impede searches for more satisfying explanations of the nature of 
the observed physical laws and parameters. 
 Multiverse theories raise serious philosophical problems about the nature of reality 
and the nature of consciousness and observation. Attempts to sharpen the discussion and 
provide a more rigorous treatment of concepts such as the number of universes, the 
probability measures in parameter space, and objective definitions of infinite sets of 
universes, have not progressed far. Nevertheless, the multiverse idea has probably earned 
a permanent place in physical science, and as new physical theories are considered in the 
future, it is likely that their consequences for biophilicity and multiple cosmic regions 
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